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Anders Walker makes several fascinating observations about the contents of
textbooks and how they relate to competing visions of what courses in substantive
criminal law should seek to accomplish. He advances at least two theses. He
states that "every year" (1) "thousands of law students graduate thinking that they
have studied criminal law using the case method, when they have not"; and (2)
"the same law students graduate thinking that they have been trained for criminal
practice, when they have not."'
These theses require a bit of modification, for Walker is not really interested
in what students think. He offers no empirical evidence, for example, that students
are systematically misled. I suspect that many students are explicitly informed that
their course in criminal law will not adequately prepare them for criminal practice,
and they cannot help but notice that their textbook devotes less space to cases than
their textbooks in torts, contracts or property. If I am mistaken, and surveys
indicate that recent graduates have false beliefs about these matters, more candor
would easily remedy their misconceptions. The fact that Walker does not
recommend that we professors be more forthright suggests that he is not really
worried about truth in advertising. Thus I will suppose that Walker's theses are
better construed to be about reality rather than belief. I will interpret him to
contend that students (1) do not read enough cases in criminal law; and (2) are
poorly prepared for careers in criminal practice.
Why do these two theses merit a special symposium in the Ohio State Journal
of Criminal Law? I cannot imagine that many full-time criminal law faculty would
dispute them. What I take to be valuable about Walker's contribution is twofold.
First, he offers a novel historical explanation of how these theses came to be true.
According to Walker, Herbert Wechsler played a pivotal role in contributing to our
predicament. Wechsler not only created the blueprint that most subsequent
textbooks would follow, but did so with a conscious purpose. He de-emphasized
cases and included more (non-case) materials precisely because he wanted to
discourage criminal practice. Instead of training legal professionals, he hoped to
lead students to appreciate the "integration of law and social science.",2 Why
would a law professor edit and adopt a textbook with the objective of steering
students away from careers in penal practice? According to Walker, Wechsler
"rejected the case method for political reasons." 3  He was distressed by the
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unwillingness of the United States Supreme Court to uphold New Deal legislation,
and believed that their ideological resistance could eventually be overcome by
training a new generation of lawyers to appreciate the potential of law to serve, in
the words of Felix Frankfurter, as a tool of "'human betterment. ' '4 Even his critics
apparently shared Wechsler's views about the ideological implications of the case
method. Roscoe Pound, we are told, wanted to preserve the case method because
he feared the rise of authoritarian Stalinism and worried about "creating statist
attorneys who ignored private interests in favor of big government." 5 Walker's
political explanation of why criminal law textbooks came to include relatively few
cases is interesting and provocative.
Second, Walker defends a controversial normative claim. He calls attention
to what we all know about courses in criminal law in order to inquire "whether this
trend is worth reversing. ' 6 In short, Walker clearly believes that something is
amiss about the way most of us teach Criminal Law today. He rhetorically asks
whether "law schools still view criminal practice to be undesirable," and
sympathizes with a recent recommendation of the Carnegie Foundation that "law
school education return to an emphasis on legal practice."7 Perhaps his most
damning criticism is that "criminal law might be teaching students how not to
think like lawyers." 8 Walker believes we should teach more cases and we should
do more to prepare our students for criminal practice. His normative thesis is also
important and worthy of extended discussion.
Before proceeding to my main reservations about Walker's theses, I want to
introduce an important qualification with which I think he would agree. I indicated
that most full-time criminal law faculty would concur with Walker's theses. We
full-time faculty assign few cases and do little to prepare our students for careers in
criminal practice. I suspect, however, that relatively few courses in Criminal Law
are taught by full-time faculty. Although no respectable law school would fail to
employ full-time faculty who are experts on the latest theoretical developments in
other subjects, a surprising number of law schools do not retain full-time faculty
who are knowledgeable about criminal law theory. Instead, adjuncts with ample
experience in prosecution or defense frequently are hired to staff these courses. In
my (admittedly limited) experience, many of these adjuncts are more likely than
full-time faculty to share Walker's normative views that textbooks are too
theoretical and do a poor job of training persons to become lawyers. Wechsler's
objective of discouraging students from careers in criminal law would be
undermined if large numbers of classes are taught by practitioners who share
Walker's apparent hostility to criminal theory.
4 Id. at 225.
' Id. at 234.
6 Id. at 220.
' Id. at 245.
8 Id. at 246.
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Whether courses are led by full-timers or part-timers, the voice of the
professor is curiously absent from Walker's analysis. After all, the content of
textbooks is only one of several factors that influence what students will learn.
Whether readings are used to develop a mastery of existing law or to instruct
students in how law can be used "for human betterment" depends not only on what
is assigned but also on how professors choose to discuss it. Students are bound to
devote the most attention to the issues we expect them to understand for their final
examinations. If we ask them to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of
retributive theories of punishment we will do less to directly prepare them for legal
practice than if we ask them to assess whether Bernard Goetz's experience as the
victim of a mugging was relevant to his plea of self-defense in his prosecution for
attempted murder.9 The influence of the professor is most evident in what parts of
the textbook will actually be assigned. Selectivity is inevitable since no one
attempts to finish the entire textbook. Walker seems dismayed by the fact that an
opening chapter of Kadish's leading textbook 0 discusses "'crime, morals and
personal liberty"' and does "not include a single case."" But the teacher's manual
recommends skipping these materials in a one-semester course. Needless to say,
virtually all required courses in substantive criminal law span only a single
semester. Although I do not know what percentage of professors follow this
advice, we should not assume that those who actually teach Criminal Law will
cover those parts of textbooks that are most abstract and least relevant for penal
practice.
In short, before we can say much that is definitive about what students are
taught, we need to know more about who is teaching them and what they are
expected to learn. The reluctance of many law schools to hire specialists in
criminal theory deserves more attention in Walker's article (as well as more
attention generally). Why is a specialty in criminal law theory devalued in the
legal academy? I am not confident that I know the answer to this question.
Perhaps law school hiring committees seek to bridge the chasm between criminal
theory and practice by hiring teachers who are more knowledgeable about the latter
than the former. Whatever the explanation, I simply mention that many students
are taught by experienced practitioners and thus are likely to receive more advice
about the realities of criminal practice than one would gather simply by examining
the contents of leading textbooks and the motivations of those who edit them. I
submit that a better methodology to discover what students actually are taught
would begin by collecting data about the types of questions on their final
examinations.
9 People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986).
10 In fact, the second chapter of the most recent textbook to which Walker refers now includes
a handful of cases and is titled "The Justification of Punishment." See SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN
J. SCHULHOFER & CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th
ed. 2007).
n Walker, supra note 1, at 239.
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But my main reservation about Walker's theses does not depend on who
happens to be teaching courses in law schools. Instead, I propose to challenge his
view about the relation between his two theses. Walker clearly believes that the
historical transition from Langdellian casebooks to texts that include an abundance
of non-case materials has helped to cause the regrettable failure to prepare students
for careers in criminal practice. Thus he suggests that a restoration of the case
method in criminal law pedagogy would do much to reverse the latter trend. Since
we no longer should share an antipathy towards criminal practice, Walker
prescribes a diet richer in cases. But is he correct? As we have seen, the two
phenomena he identifies may have had a common cause; Wechsler was led to
include more materials precisely because he hoped to discourage students from
becoming practitioners. But even though Walker may be correct about the
motivations of Wechsler himself, the fact that most textbooks include a high ratio
of non-case materials to cases strikes me as largely unconnected to the fact that
students are poorly trained for careers in penal practice. I will support my
skepticism about the relation between these two theses by asking how we would be
advised to change our pedagogy if we aim to prepare students for work in
prosecution or defense. In my judgment, requiring students to read more cases and
fewer materials would be far down the list of reforms that should be implemented
by a school that was persuaded to follow the recommendations of the Carnegie
Foundation.
Why should we believe that a return to the case method would better prepare
students for careers as prosecutors or defense attorneys? Walker seems to assume
that the study of cases is the best way to learn existing law, and a practicing lawyer
cannot be effective unless he knows what the law is. Each assumption contains
only a grain of truth. Teachers who aspire to ensure that their students learn the
law as it is are not advised to adopt a textbook that includes more cases and less
commentary. As we all know, the criminal law today is almost entirely statutory.
Thus Joseph Beale's position that the law can be found, classified, and
organized simply by reading reported cases is antiquated, at least in the
criminal domain. It is noteworthy that the Carnegie Foundation itself faulted the
case method as a cause of the lack of attention to practice.12 Even if Beale were
correct, students gain the skills learned through the case method in other courses; I
see no reason why every class in the first-year curriculum should duplicate the
same methodology and focus almost exclusively on cases. Moreover, I contend
that a hornbook is superior to a casebook to help students understand existing
law.' 3 I suspect that most professors supplement their required textbooks with a
12 See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE CARNEGIE FOUND., Summary of EDUCATING
LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007), available at
http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/files/elibrary/EducatingLawyers-summnary.pdf.
13 Walker might have pondered why the market in the United States includes so few
sophisticated hornbooks in criminal law. Dressler's Understanding Criminal Law is easily the best;
Wayne LaFave's Criminal Law is second. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW (5th
ed. 2009); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed. 2003). The remaining hombooks are a distant
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hornbook, and many students spend as much time reading the latter as the former.
If so, they learn more existing law in their courses than is covered in their
textbooks.
But even a thorough knowledge of the law gained through cases and
hornbooks would be only marginally effective in preparing students for careers in
criminal law. The root of the problem is that the penal law itself is not very
important in criminal practice.' 4 Instead, the daily work of the criminal lawyer is
an exercise in what some commentators deride as McJustice.'5 Overburdened
prosecutors and impossibly overworked public defenders participate in the plea
bargaining assembly line. No casebook or textbook that focuses on the law as it is
can possibly assist aspiring practitioners to play an effective role in this travesty of
justice. Coaching students to become more proficient at the bargaining table
would do more to train them for criminal practice than imparting an encyclopedic
knowledge of the substantive criminal law.
If I am largely correct about the irrelevance of law to contemporary criminal
practice, what might be done to improve the situation? What reforms would allow
us to dispense real justice rather than assembly-line justice? As many
commentators have pointed out, our criminal justice system would collapse if
fewer bargains were struck and cases were less likely to be resolved through guilty
pleas. Perhaps criminologists and social scientists can call attention to the sorry
state of criminal practice and propose a range of possible solutions. But any
discussion of these alternatives in the classroom would only exacerbate the
problem Walker has identified by requiring students to read more materials and, by
default, fewer cases.
Conversely, why should we believe that the study of non-case materials is the
more effective device to reveal the connections between law and social policy?
These relations can be explored just as well by selecting appropriate cases.
Consider, for example, the single case I imagine is read by a higher percentage of
students than any in the criminal law canon: R. v. Dudley and Stephens.16 There is
little point in assigning this case to discover what the law is. Whatever may have
been true a century ago, cannibalism on lifeboats has thankfully become rare. I
would be astonished to learn that class discussion about this case did not raise the
following sorts of theoretical inquiries. Should these defendants have a defense for
their deliberate killing? If not, why not? If so, what kind of a defense should they
have? Are killings permitted in these exigent circumstances, in which case the
third. The corresponding market in the United Kingdom is generally of higher quality-another fact
(if I am correct) that deserves more attention from persons interested in the teaching of criminal law.
14 See Douglas Husak, Is the Criminal Law Important?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 261, 262
(2003).
15 See Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
9, 2008, at Al.
16 [1884] 14 Q.B.D. 273.
17 See A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, CANNMALISM AND THE COMMON LAW ix, 271 (1984).
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defendants are justified, or do we simply withhold blame from persons who
perform wrongful acts under necessity, in which case the defendants are excused?
Is the answer to this question important; does the distinction between justification
and excuse matter? Why or why not? What interests would be served by
punishing these defendants? Can such terrible acts be deterred, and is it desirable
to try to do so? Are executive pardons an adequate remedy for situations in which
the rigid application of legal rules produce injustice? Would a judgment of
acquittal exceed the boundaries of the judicial role and impinge on the function of
the legislature? Of course, this list could continue. My point is that cases can be
used to examine the very kinds of abstract issues that Walker contends are raised
more effectively by what he calls the anti-case method.
Obviously, Dudley is only one of countless cases that might be used to
explore broad issues of social policy. Comparable illustrations could be multiplied
indefinitely, although it is almost patronizing to do so. Here are three examples.
Consider the decisions about whether to retain and how to restrict the felony-
murder rule. Or the various cases about whether persons have a defense for the
possession and distribution of drug paraphernalia when they dispense needles to
heroin addicts. Or the cases about the circumstances under which deadly force
may be used to stop fleeing felons. Clearly, the case method itself need not
produce students who are "politically unresponsive."'
' 8
If Walker wants to rewrite textbooks to better assist students in learning the
body of law they are most likely to need for legal practice, he might have been
more critical of what topics these texts actually canvass. Obviously, editorial
judgment is needed to decide which crimes a casebook should include or exclude.
By what criterion should such decisions be made? It seems reasonable to suppose
that legal realities would furnish the dominant (but not the sole) criterion. In other
words, statutes that are breached and enforced most frequently deserve a prominent
place in books that help students learn the law. If teaching is geared toward
practice, why focus on topics that practitioners are unlikely to confront?
By the foregoing criterion, all of the leading textbooks are dismal failures.
Many include a chapter on theft, homicide, and (more recently) rape, but relatively
few criminal lawyers will confront the latter two issues in their practice. By
contrast, drug offenses have become the meat and potatoes of our criminal justice
system. About thirty-five million arrests for drug offenses have occurred since
1980, with the latest figure over 1.84 million.' 9 Needless to say, these figures
dwarf those for homicide or rape. Yet no leading textbook devotes a chapter to
this important area of law, and some do not include a single case involving drugs.20
Students who are remarkably adept in distinguishing voluntary from involuntary
18 Walker, supra note 1, at 227.
19 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Drug Law Violations and Enforcement,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dcf/enforce.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2009).
20 Yet another fascinating question is why this is so. One answer is that cases are assembled
to teach students about the Model Penal Code, and drug offenses are not included there.
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manslaughter are clueless (for example) about whether the law proscribes
possession of a controlled substance in circumstances in which the defendant is
uncertain about the nature of the substance possessed. If we professors want to
prepare our students for careers in criminal practice, we would be well advised to
change the topics our leading textbooks cover. Walker's solution of substituting
more cases for non-case materials would do nothing to improve this situation
unless the cases to be substituted examine topics that are more reflective of legal
realities. As an added bonus, a chapter on drug offenses would not only prepare
students for issues they are likely to confront in criminal practice, but also would
invite the very sort of political and policy inquiries Wechsler hoped to stimulate.
No statutory schemes enforced with such vigor have triggered more reasonable
opposition from scholars and the public than the regime of drug proscriptions. 2
What are our pedagogical objectives if we are aware that our courses do not
prepare students for criminal practice? Most of us have a multiplicity of purposes,
and I cannot speak for others. One of my aspirations, however, is to make a small
contribution to legal literacy. I wince when I overhear licensed attorneys make
comments about the criminal justice system that are no more informed than those
of the general public. Laypersons often complain that we are too soft on crime and
allow too many dangerous persons to escape punishment. Law school graduates
should be able to correct these common misconceptions about our penal
institutions. I have no doubt that my attitudes about the objectives of a course in
criminal law are shaped by the fact that I have spent most of my professional
career in a department of philosophy rather than on a faculty of law. Still, I make
no apologies for the goals I try to achieve. Since few students will become
prosecutors or defense attorneys, it makes little sense to focus solely on the skills
needed for practice. If a course in criminal law continues to be required in the
first-year curriculum, we have reason to examine issues that are not directly
germane to practice.
Walker seemingly believes that the kind of course we teach does a great
disservice to our students. As we have seen, he laments that "criminal law might
be teaching students how not to think like lawyers."2 2 What exactly does he mean?
I tend to favor the view that there is nothing very distinctive about how lawyers
ought to think,23 and Walker says little about why he apparently believes
otherwise. He does indicate, however, that the non-case materials collected in
textbooks are designed to "[get] students to think like legislators., 24 I am unsure
why the thought processes of legislators should be fundamentally unlike those of
lawyers. Good legislators must anticipate the problems criminal justice officials
will confront in interpreting and applying the statutes they enact, and thus must
think like lawyers in order to craft good legislation. Moreover, if law schools do
21 See, e.g., DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, DRUGS AND RIGHTS 51 (1992).
22 Walker, supra note 1, at 246.
23 See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMiLY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING 3 (2008).
24 Walker, supra note 1, at 240.
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not train students to think like legislators, what discipline will do so? The topic is
far too important to relegate to us philosophers.
I want to conclude on an ironic and pessimistic note. Criminal law strikes me
as an odd choice in which to instruct students of law's potential to serve broad
policy objectives. Almost any other course in the first-year curriculum-
Constitutional Law in particular-would be more suitable to convey this message.
Still, Wechsler undoubtedly attained his goal to "revolutionize law teaching.,
25
But how would he have assessed the effects of this revolution? Wechsler would
have been thrilled at his own success in influencing legions of subsequent editors
to include more materials and fewer cases in the textbooks assigned to students.
Moreover, the practice of criminal law remains unpopular. But I suspect that
Wechsler would have been devastated if his ambition in rewriting textbooks was to
lead students to appreciate the potential of law to serve as a tool of human
betterment. After all, the reason to help students to gain this appreciation is the
expectation that they will use their knowledge to better humanity. I see little
evidence that students have internalized this lesson, for the criminal law today is
probably responsible for more injustice and misery than at the time Wechsler
published his first textbook. The fact that a couple of generations of law students
allegedly have been encouraged to think like legislators rather than lawyers has not
reaped discernible benefits in the quality of penal legislation. In my judgment,
states continue to respond to social problems through hastily enacted and poorly
conceived crimes dujour. As a result, our prisons are bulging and our budgets are
strained by the size of our criminal justice institutions. How can we reduce the
number of penal laws that are enacted while improving their content? Legal
philosophers might contribute by defending a minimalist theory of
criminalization,26 but comprehensive solutions remain elusive.27 In any event, if
the goal of adopting non-case materials is to improve the quality of lawmaking in
the criminal arena, few sensible persons should conclude that the effort has been
successful. Surely Walker is correct that we do a poor job of training lawyers.
Unfortunately, Wechsler's dream to use the criminal law as a tool of human
betterment remains unfulfilled.
25 Id. at 219.
26 DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION (2008).
27 Some commentators have recently defended aspects of the status quo that usually are
criticized. See, for example, Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TExAs L. REv.
223 (2007) (arguing that criticism has been muted even though the criminal law in the United States
has overcriminalized since colonial times); and Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491 (2008) (arguing that broad penal statutes serve a number of important utilitarian
functions).
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